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UK CAR-FLIPPING:
THE VAT FRAUD MARKET-PLACE AND CERTIFIED SOLUTIONS
Richard Thompson Ainsworth
Missing Trader Intra-Community (MTIC) fraud1 and its offspring carousel fraud2
and contra trading fraud3 are siphoning huge amounts of VAT revenue from the UK
Treasury.4 This fraud is not a function of the goods involved.5 It is a function of the
market-place. Recently another type of market-place dependent VAT fraud has taken
hold in the UK – car-flipping.
In some instances the market-place where these frauds festers is a pre-existing or
natural market-place, one that grows out of legitimate commercial practices. Fraudsters
enter this market-place (so the argument goes) and take advantage of legitimate
businesses who unwittingly get caught up in the fraud of others.6 In other instances the
market-place is a wholly artificial construct of the fraudsters. In this case, almost
everyone involved has direct knowledge of the fraud. But make no mistake about it, it is
the market-place that makes these frauds work.
A previous article7 argued that when one takes a global view of the VAT –
looking more broadly than the specific rules in the UK, or even the rules in the EU – that
patterns of VAT fraud become more apparent. In this instance the focus was on patterns
of MTIC or carousel fraud, and the question asked was whether or not the UK’s focus on
cell phones and computer chips was warranted.

1

The traditional description of Missing Trader Intra-Community (MTIC) fraud is that A makes a zero-rated
intra-community sale to B who sells onward to C. In the meantime, B “goes missing” and keeps the VAT
collected on the sale to C. B files no return.
2
The carousel variant of MTIC fraud simply has C re-selling the same goods back to A. When C reexports the goods they are again zero-rated, and C files for a refund of the input tax. It is called “carousel
fraud” because the goods travel around and around as if on a carousel.
3
Contra trading involves setting up two overlapping carousels spinning between various EU countries and
countries outside the EU. One will often involve services such as software or licenses and the other goods
such as mobile phones. Some of the trades will be legitimate and a small VAT payment will often be made
in one country to disguise a much bigger reclaim in another.
4
Best estimates of annual VAT losses to MTIC fraud for the E.U. are in the range of 23 billion euros.
Europol Press release, Experts discuss ‘Missing Trader Inter-Community Fraud, (Dec. 13, 2006) available
at: http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=news&news=pr061213.htm. An in-depth, EU-wide
survey by the Commission is underway. European Commission, EU coherent strategy against fiscal fraud
– Frequently Asked Questions, (MEMO/06/221).
5
But see OJ (L 109) 42 (granting the UK a derogation for a reverse charge limited to domestic sales of cell
phones and computer chips [above a threshold of GBP 5,000] that went into effect on June 1, 2007,
suggests a believe that this fraud is indeed a function o the type of goods involved).
6
Case 384/04, Commissioners of Custom & Excise v. Federation of Technological Industries & Others,
2006 E.C.R. I-04191 (May 11, 2006) (upholding joint and several liability provisions where participants
knew or should have known of the fraud).
7
Richard T. Ainsworth, Tackling VAT Fraud: Car-flipping and Computer Chips on a Carousel, 46 TAX
NOTES INT’L. 267 (April 16, 2007).
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The familiar argument of HMRC is that MTIC or carousel fraud “requires” high
value good that are small in size.8 An expensive computer chip is the ideal example, and
indeed a considerable amount of fraud has been uncovered in the UK involving computer
chips. However, when the Canadian GST is examined the same type of fraud appears not
in computer chips, but in automobiles and earth moving equipment. Referred to as “carflipping” in the Canadian literature, this type of fraud produced not only the largest GST
fraud cases in Canadian history,9 but it calls into question the UK assumption that high
value/ small volume goods are necessary for this fraud.10
It now appears that a number of fraudsters in the UK have developed schemes
similar to the Canadian car-flipping schemes. Expensive automobiles are sold to disabled
individuals (without VAT) and are immediately “flipped” to third parties for a profit.
The profit is entirely the VAT – that is, the amount of VAT that would have been due on
the sale if it had been made directly to the third party.
Although based entirely on news reports at this point, the fact patterns in the UK
appear very similar to the Canadian cases. Are fraudsters in the UK learning their
business by reading Canadian case law, or is there something in the fabric of the VAT
that facilitates fraud? In other words, have we come full circle, or is there something
deeper here that needs to be dealt with?
This article re-affirms and extends two earlier conclusions. It first re-affirms the
proposition that the problem is in the market-place, not the products. This conclusion is
extended with an emphasis that the problematical market-place could very well be a
wholly artificial one, constructed solely for the purposes of committing this fraud.
This article also re-affirms another conclusion. It re-affirms that the answer to
this kind of VAT fraud is not found in making fundamental structural changes in the
VAT, but rather in making changes in tax administration, particularly changes that
8

Regalway Care Ltd. v. Shillingford and others (First Touch Communications Ltd. and others intervening)
[2005] EWHC 261 (CH), [2005] All ER (D) 394 (Feb) (Feb 25, 2005) at ¶20.
9
Ontario Motor Vehicle Industry Council, Annual Report & 2005 Business Plan 9 (indicating that these
scams cost the Canadian government $50 million and that they were the largest GST frauds in history)
available at http://www.omvic.on.ca/News/Annual_Report_2004.pdf.
10
An important caveat needs to be added here. Even though the Canadian car-flipping frauds were the
largest GST frauds in Canadian history, the revenue losses are far lower than those encountered in the UK
carousel frauds in computer chips and cell phones. The largest Canadian car-flipping frauds approach $50
million in lost GST, whereas the UK carousels in computer chips and cell phones are generally much
higher. For example, H.M. Revenue & Customs v. Egleton and Others [2006] EWHC 2313 (Ch) (Sept. 19,
2006) involved £35,876,065.67; Fresh ‘N’ Clean (Wales) Ltd. (in Liquidation) v. Helim Miah, Hillgate
Corporation Limited, Janail Singh, Trademaster Limited, German Giovanni de La Torre [2006] EWHC
903 (Ch) Ch D; 2006 WL 1288340 involved £11,603,354.60; Regalway Care Ltd. v. Shillingford and
others (First Touch Communications Ltd. and others intervening) [2005] EWHC 261 (CH), [2005] All ER
(D) 394 (Feb) (Feb 25, 2005) involved £3,010,607.20. Overall U.K. VAT losses are estimated to be
between 2.98 billion and 4.47 billion euros this year. H.M. Treasury, 2006 PRE-BUDGET REPORT:
INVESTING IN BRITAIN’S POTENTIAL – BUILDING OUR LONG TERM FUTURE 126 (Dec. 2006) Cm 6984. The
reason for this difference could well be the commodity nature of cell phones and computer chips, their size
and relative value.
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involve the certification of the technology that traders use to achieve VAT compliance.
This argument is extended to meet the circumstances of the UK “car-flipping” fraud.
Because this particular variant of VAT fraud involves B2C (business to
consumer) transactions, rather than B2B (business to business) transactions, the
technology analysis needs to be extended to the consumer level. This extension involves
the use of biometrics identifies and digital exemption certificates in IDs that are provided
to individuals who qualify for certain exemptions.
The key element in all of these VAT fraud categories is the presence of an
exemption. In MTIC, carousel fraud and contra-trading the exemption for the intracommunity sale of goods is abused. In the Canadian car-flipping cases it is the intraprovincial sales exemption, the export sales exemption or the status Indian sales
exemption that is abused. The mechanism of the fraud in each of these cases is to (1)
monetize the value of the exemption and then (2) keep this value away from Treasury.
There are a number of similarities between the UK and the Canadian car-flipping
cases. By aligning these cases, examining the similarities, and comparing the operation
of the fraudsters it is possible to identify other places where car-flipping VAT fraud
arises. For example, if the 7% Canadian GST proved profitable for the fraudsters, and if
the 17.5% UK VAT was more so, then how much more tempting should car-flipping be
in Brazil where the combined state and federal consumption taxes on automobiles
approaches a 50%11 effective rate?
Canadian Car-flipping – Exempt Sales to Native Americans
Regina v. Prokofiew12 is the classic Canadian car-flipping fact pattern. It involves
the sale of automobiles to status Indians on reservations who qualify for an exemption
from the 7% federal GST pursuant to the Indian Act.13
In Prokofiew the market-place that facilitates this fraud is the wholesale
automobile market. With access to this market “flipping-cars” is a simple matter of
approaching a dealership [“B”] with a signed contract to purchase a vehicle from another
party [“C” – who is a tax-exempt Indian], and then representing that when the needed
11

This rate is the result of a cascading system of consumption taxes in Brazil. At the federal level a 25%
tax is collected on manufacturers (in this case an automobile manufacturer). When the car is re-sold
through a dealership to a consumer a state tax (normally at 12%) applies. The complexity in the Brazilian
system begins with the inclusion of the federal tax in the state tax base. It is further complicated with the
state tax itself being included in state tax base.
And this is not the end of the story, because there are gross receipts taxes in Brazil that are applied
in addition, and they include both of the federal and state consumption taxes in their tax base. Generally
speaking, if you declare your taxes on the “actual profit” regime (according to Brazilian GAAP), those
taxes will be non-cumulative, with rates of 1.65% (PIS) and 7.6% (COFINS). Most large companies will
be on an “actual profit” regime. Smaller companies follow an “estimated profit” regime. Those taxes are
cumulative with rates of 0.65% and 3%, respectively.
12
(Ontario Superior Court of Justice) 2004 Carswell Ont 3827; [2004] G.S.T.C. 103 (Mar. 22, 2004).
13
Indian Act, R.S.C., ch. I-5 § 87 (1985) (Can.).
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vehicle is acquired at auction [through “A” – a paper company] then the whole
transaction can be consummated at the bank.
If “A” and “C” are one and the same person, then funds from “B” (with GST) are
paid to “A” and then immediately returned to “B” (without GST) from “C.” If the
dealership “B” does not inspect the car (because commercial practice is not to bother with
this detail), then it does not matter if the automobile sold is a “phantom vehicle” or one
that has already been sold between “A” and “C” before. There is no one to complain
about delivery. Thus, the dealership “B” files a return to recover the GST it paid to “A,”
and keeps a small markup as profit from its “risk free” sale to “C.” The fraudster [“A”
and “C”] files no returns and keeps as his “profit” the difference between the GST paid
by “B” and “B’s” profit.
Revenue Canada is concerned about fraudulent use of the Native American
exemption. Mr. Robert Cranford, an agent from Revenue Canada testified in the
Prokofiew case that,
….. we have to be comfortable that the good or service is consumed on the
Reservation so consequently we are looking for documentation … In
general, we look for documentation that shows delivery to a Reservation
… we would want to see documents proving that the vehicle was, in fact,
delivered to a Reserve … 14
Knowing that documentary proof of delivery to a reservation is important the
Canadian fraudsters take pictures of the delivery (but not much more). One of these
delivery agents testified in the Prokofiew case, and his testimony is summarized as
follows:
Mr. Ponte testified that he was a runner at Oakville Motors Inc. and took
instructions from Mr. Prokofiew and Mr. Marling-Howse. In his view,
they operated a business of buying and selling real cars. He drove cars
mainly to a gas station on the Reservation and, on occasion, to a trailer.
Once at one of these locations, a Polaroid picture would be taken of the
vehicle along with the sign of the gas station or the car dealership at the
trailer. Neither the dealer plates nor the VIN on the vehicle would be
included in the picture. The vehicles would then be driven back to
Oakville Motors Inc. or the location from which he had picked the vehicle
up. The photo and the camera would then be delivered to Mr. Prokofiew
or Mr. Marling-Howse. Of all the cars he took up to the Reserve, he does
not remember leaving any there.15
The reason for not including the dealer plates or the VIN in the pictures was so
that the same vehicles could be sold multiple times either to the same party or to different
parties to generate excess refunds.16
14

Id. at ¶ 68.
Id. at ¶ 329.
16
Id. at ¶ 251 & 224 – 259 (in this case proof was advanced that 188 vehicles were sold twice, 54 vehicles
were sold three times, 17 vehicles were sold four times, and 2 vehicles were sold five times).
15
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UK Car-flipping – Exempt Sales to the Disabled
An investigation for BBC Radio 4’s You and Yours program17 reported
widespread and systematic abuse of a VAT exemption18 that allows disabled persons in
wheelchairs19 to buy new cars for personal use at a zero rate of VAT. The car must be
adapted to accommodate the disabled person.20 In a series of follow-up investigative
reports elsewhere in the press the BBC findings seemed to be confirmed.21 Very little
else is being revealed by authorities at the present time. The Times reports:
A spokeswoman for Revenue and Customs said it is a fraud to buy a car
VAT free for “personal use” when it was in fact intended to be sold on.
“There is a wider ongoing inquiry into this which (in the first instance) is
being handled by the police,” she said.22
In the original BBC Radio 4 You and Yours program the investigative reporter
Shari Vaal outlined how the abuse occurs:
Well, what happens is the wheelchair user goes into a dealership and
orders a high value car with a minor adaptation like a knob on a steering
wheel and puts down a deposit. When the car arrives he pays for it and it
is delivered to his house. The steering wheel knob is removed and then,
without driving it, sells it immediately to another dealership for more than
he bought it. He pockets the profit and then goes back to a garage or
another garage and buys another one.23
As under the Canadian provisions, complying with the UK requirements for VAT
exemption has two parts: proof of status, and then proof of consumption. In Canada this
means that the purchaser [“C”] must prove that they are a status Indian qualifying for the
exemption,24 and then that “consumption” is occurring on a reservation (accomplished by

17

Stuart Flinders, You and Yours: Disabled Driver Scam, BBC Radio 4 (July 25, 1007) transcript available
at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/youandyours/transcripts_2007_30_wed_01.shtml#.
18
VAT Act, 1994, §30 (holding that goods and services specified in Schedule 8 of the Act are zero-rated).
19
A “wheelchair user” is “… anyone who has to use a wheelchair (electronically powered or otherwise) in
order to be mobile.” VAT Notice 701/59 at 2.2 & 2.5. The law also applies to “stretcher users.” VAT
Notice 701/59 at 1.5.
20
VAT Act, 1994, Sch 8 Group 12(2)(f) & (2)(A) and Notes 5 & 5L) ; VAT Rules, (2001) SI 2001/754;
VAT Notice 701/59.
21
Andy Morgan, Paralympic Squad in ‘Luxury Car Scam,’ THE SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON) 4 (July 29,
2007) (presenting the results of a Sunday Times investigation of several current and retired international
paralympians).
22
Id. at 4.
23
BBC, supra note 17.
24
Regina v. Foy, 2003 CarswellOnt 5861; [2005] G.S.T.C. 31 (Mar. 3, 2003) at ¶19 indicates:
The [car] dealer maintains a document trail that will satisfy GST auditors of the
authenticity of the sales, and of the tax-exempt nature of the re-sales. The wholesaler
provides copies of the numbered, status Indian cards of the re-sale “buyers,” (to whom
the wholesaler pays a fee for the use of the name and card). He may also provide a copy
or number of the “buyer’s” drivers’ license. The dealer creates and keeps on record
normal sale documents including documents that prove delivery to a reservation.
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making delivery to a reservation).25 In the UK the process is similar. There is a
requirement that the purchaser prove that they are an “eligible wheelchair user,”26 and
then a requirement that what is being “consumed” is a car that has been adapted for use
before delivery.27
As in Canada, car dealers in the UK document consumption with photographs.
Just as in Canada, the accuracy of these photos may be held up to question. The London
Times investigation reports:
In order to obtain the tax break, a wheelchair user has to produce
evidence of their disability and confirm that the car is being purchased for
their own use.
The [car] dealer takes a photograph of the interior of the car to
show that it has been adapted. … To speed up the throughput, the cars
were rarely properly adapted for a handicapped driver. “They would put
the hand controls inside the car but not bolt them down. They would take
a photograph and then take the controls out again,” claimed the source.
“Sometimes they would use the same photograph again and again for
different cars.28
The most significant variant between the Canadian and the UK car-flipping scams
is that the Canadian fraud involves a B2B transaction, and the UK fraud involves a B2C
transaction. In the Canadian car-flipping cases the fraud generates a GST refund for a
“disappearing” business. In the UK car-flipping cases the fraud generates a four-way
profit-split among the disabled person, two car dealerships, and the final consumer.
The status of the disabled person is central to the UK car-flipping fraud (just as
the status of the Native American was central to the Canadian car-flipping fraud). The
disabled person not only purchases the car VAT free, but sells it on to another dealer
VAT-free.29
25

In the Canadian rules no nexus between these elements was required. Thus, car could be delivered to any
reservation in Canada. It was not required that the status Indian be a resident on that reservation, or even
that the individual be physically present on the reservation to which the car was delivered.
26
VAT Notice 701/59 at 12.1 & 13 (indicating that the individual needs to make a declaration that gives the
“details of his disability,” and “confirm that the vehicle is for his personal use,” and then providing an
sample “Eligibility Declaration by a Disabled Person” form).
27
VAT Notice 701/59 at 6.2 (indicating that if the adaptation is performed after acquisition of the car, then
the exemption applies only to the installation, repair or maintenance of the adaptation, not the purchase
price of the car).
28
Andy Morgan, supra note 21.
29
VAT Act, 1994, § 4(1) (indicating that VAT is only chargeable by a taxable person “in the course or
furtherance of any business”). Because the “eligible wheelchair user” declares that the vehicle is purchased
for the “domestic or personal use” [VAT Notice 701/59 at 5.1 & 2.7] the argument would be that the
subsequent sale of this vehicle (now a “used-vehicle”) is the sale of personal property and not subject to
VAT. Sterling v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise, [1985] VATTR 232, [1986] 2 CMLR 117
(Edinburgh VAT Tribunal). This is not to say that a strong argument might be made by HMRC that in
instances where an “eligible wheelchair user” is purchasing and re-selling over one-hundred vehicles a year
that they are a taxable person acting in the course or furtherance of a business, thereby making both the
purchase of the vehicle and its re-sale taxable. VAT Notice 701/59, at 2.7 indicates, “You cannot zero rate
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There is a small amount of VAT that is paid when the whole chain of transactions
is considered. This occurs when the second dealer sells the car onward. The second
dealer can sell under the margin scheme for second-hand goods, a provision which limits
the tax base to the difference between the price paid for the car (from the disabled
individual) and the amount paid by the ultimate purchaser of the car.30 The original BBC
Radio 4 You and Yours program presents the following example:
… I tried to order a top of the range 3.6 V8 Range Rover Vogue
SE with leather seats and 20 inch alloy wheels and DVDs in the seats this
week and I was told it would take six months but those lead times can be
up to 18 months for really high spec cars.
Now let's do some sums here. For me to order the car I've just
described with all the toys costs £72,000 including VAT. For a
wheelchair user the same car with just a knob on the steering wheel31 costs
him £62,000.
Now in this case when he collects the car he sells it to another
dealer for £65,000, making an instant £3,000 profit. The dealer then sells
the car to an innocent buyer, a member of the public, as new with just a
hundred miles on the clock for £67,500 making a two and half thousand
pound profit. But by selling a new top spec car for nearly £5,000 less than
the order price not only does he undercut all the other dealers but a brand
new top spec car is available to the public without the six month wait and
of course deals like that are snapped up.
Now I've found a car fitting that description in a showroom in
Yorkshire, asking price £67,500 and whilst I couldn't record what went on
the salesman let me take the car out for a test drive.32

vehicles supplied to a business regardless of who uses them or how they have been adapted – for example
you cannot zero rate an adapted vehicle that will be used as a taxi.”
30
In general VAT is charged on the full value of any goods (including second-hand motor cars) sold by a
taxable person. However, the UK allows taxable persons re-selling second-hand motor cars to elect to
collect VAT on the profit margin (instead f the full market value). [VAT Act, 1994 §§ 32, 50A; Finance
Act, 1995, § 24; VAT (Special Provisions) Order (1995) SI 1995/1268; see also RECAST VAT DIRECTIVE
(RVD) Art. 313-17 [the SIXTH COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 17 May 1977on the harmonization of the laws of the
Member States relating to turnover tax – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment
(77/388/EEC) 1977 O.J. (L 145) 1 was repealed and replaced with the RECAST VAT DIRECTIVE (RVD) on
November 28, 2006 as Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the Common system of value added tax, O.J. (L
347) 1].
31
The “knob on the steering wheel” is a favorite adaptation in the new reports. This may be because it is
the specific example of a “substantial adaptation” used by HMRC in VAT Notice 701/59, at 3.4.
A substantial adaptation enables a wheelchair user to use a vehicle which he could not
use before it was adapted. For example, a spinner device, such as a knob on a steering
wheel, may not seem substantial to an able bodied person but it would be substantial for a
disabled wheelchair user who could not otherwise use the device.
It may also be that a “knob on the steering wheel” is very easy to remove, and doing so would not impact
the structural integrity of the vehicle. However, it does seem that HMRC has cut a very clear path for the
fraudsters to follow.
32
BBC, supra note 17.
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There are three tax-steps in this example. (1) When the first dealer sells the 3.6
V8 Range Rover Vogue SE to the “eligible wheelchair user” the transaction is zero-rated.
No VAT is collected, but this dealer can reclaim the full VAT paid on the inventorypurchase of the vehicle. (2) When the “eligible wheelchair user” sells the car to another
dealer for a £3,000 mark-up no VAT is collected. The transaction is “out of scope” of the
VAT. (3) When the second dealer re-sells the car under the margin scheme he charges
£43.75 VAT.33
If the car had been sold directly to the final consumer the VAT charge would be
£1,181.25.34 Effectively then, this scheme strips £65,000 of value added from the tax
base, and splits the £1,137.50 in VAT due on this value between the dealerships, the
“eligible wheelchair user,” and the final consumer.
It is not clear from the news reports how widespread the UK car-flipping scam is,
but early estimates are that the VAT loss is significant. A selection of news reports
describe (a) “… a huge scam … [involving] 60 disabled drivers … thought to have cost
taxpayers £225million … [involving] supercars such as Maseratis, Aston Martin DB9s,
Bentleys and Lamborghini Gallardos … one suspect in the North West ordered 37 cars in
a month,”35 (b) “… six people quizzed by the cops bought more than 60 high-end motors
each in just two years…”36 (c) “… a group of wheelchair users are making large profits
selling high valued cars such as this Ferrari … [that] could result in up to £20,000 profit
for a high value car … alleged [to include] Range Rovers, Mercedes, Bentleys, Maseratis,
Porches and Lanborghinis…”37 and (d) in an investigation of the paralympic squad that
included foreign athletes “… The Sunday Times has identified several current and retired
internationals who have allegedly profited from such sales. Two of the former
internationals are alleged to have bought more than 100 cars each. Another competitor,
who has not represented his country, is claimed to have made several hundred thousand
pounds in profit.”38
Is there a Difference Between Canadian and UK Car-flipping?
Although Canadian car-flipping occurs in a B2B setting, and UK car-flipping
occurs in a B2C setting, the differences between these frauds are insignificant. Both take
advantage of an exemption granted to individuals in a special group that is unlimited in
scope and highly moveable. These attributes of the exemption (the unlimited scope and
high mobility of the exemption value) are the real facilitators of these frauds.

33

£ 2,500 x 17.5% = £ 43.75.
£ 67,500 x 17.5% = £ 1,181.25.
35
Tom Wells, Disabled “car scammer” is MBE, THE SUN (July 30, 2007) (emphasis in original) available
at http://www.thesun.co.uk/article/0,,2002410000-2007350066,00.html.
36
Tom Wells, Disabled Gang’s Supercar Scam, THE SUN (July 27, 2007) (emphasis in original) available
at http://www.thesun.co.uk/article/0,,2002410000-2007340710,00.html.
37
Wheelchair-users Investigated over Disabled Car Scam, THE DAILY MAIL (July 26, 2007) available at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=470986&in_page_id=1770.
38
Andy Morgan, supra note 21.
34
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Neither in Canada, nor in the UK is there any limit on the number of cars that a
status Indian or an “eligible wheelchair user” can purchase GST/VAT free. The sky is
the limit. In both Canada and the UK it is not the automobile that is the facilitator of the
fraud; the automobile is simply the vehicle for (a) monetizing the exemption, and (b)
transferring the benefits of the exemption from the intended party to a series of
unintended beneficiaries. In both Canada and the UK the fraudsters need just one more
thing (other than the exemption itself) – they need a market-place within which the value
of the GST/VAT exemption can be transferred.
In the B2B scenarios fraudsters frequently use pre-existing markets, but in the
B2C scenarios these market-places do not exist, and need to be created artificially. After
all, how often would one expect a wheelchair user to purchase a new car? Certainly, the
answer is not the 37 times a month, or the over 100 times a year that some of the
newspapers report, but this is what it takes to accomplish this fraud on a large scale.39
Characteristics of the Market-place
When the UK problems with MTIC/ carousel fraud were compared with the carflipping fraud in Canada six market-place characteristics were identified as common to
both frauds. The conclusion drawn at that time was that the problem was not in the
products. The problem is in the market-place where the products are sold. Thus, shutting
down (in the case of artificial markets) or regulating (in the case of legitimate business
markets) these market-paces solves the problem. Regulation was the preferred option.
When that analysis is superimposed on the UK car-flipping scam, the results are
nearly identical. This suggests that the same technology-based solution – the
certification of transaction tax systems – is the appropriate answer for the UK carflipping fraud as well (with an adjustment for the fact that this fraud occurs in a B2C
setting). The six characteristics and their application to the UK car-flipping frauds are as
follows:
1. Physical-financial separation. In traditional MTIC/ carousel fraud it is
common for middlemen to be dealing in goods that are never delivered or
never even inspected before being resold. The concern of the fraudsters is
only with the money, relying fully on a secure freight forwarding facility or a
bonded auction warehouse to hold the goods that could be pre-sold to another
party before they are even purchased in the resale transaction.
However, the nature of the UK car-flipping scam and the rules under VAT
Notice 701/59 (at least the requirement that the wheelchair user attest that the
vehicle is for “domestic or personal use” [at 2.7] and the requirement that the
39

There is a variant of this fraud that does not appear in the press (yet). Rather than one disabled person
returning again-and-again to a car dealership, middlemen could easily suggest to a large number of
individuals at an old-age home (for example) that they qualify for this exemption. If they would like to
participate once or twice a year or so, then some additional funds could be secured. The middleman would
arrange everything, including the onward sale.
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car be “adapted to suit his specific needs” [at 3.2]) as well as the requirement
that the car be registered at least for a short time in the name of the wheelchair
user40 makes the fraud easier to carry out, if there is an actual delivery.41
Thus, the physical-financial separation is not as extreme in the UK carflipping cases. However, in these frauds there is very little sense in the news
reports that the wheelchair buyers are actually using the cars they have
delivered to them, so the sense of “physical-financial separation” is still
present.
2. Low risk transactions. In traditional MTIC/ carousel fraud middlemen
frequently acquire goods after commitments for their resale have been entered
into. It is also common for pre-payments for the resale of the goods to be
received before the goods that are to be re-sold are paid for. There is rarely
any on-site inventory. This market completely eliminates speculative risk.
Middlemen add very little value and as a result their profit margin is
correspondingly thin.
In the case of UK car-flipping the transactions are also low risk. News
reports indicate that the transactions, “… could be just a half an hour’s work
as the paperwork and financing was often organized for them … [and] in
reality several of the [paralympic] players were given the cash to buy their
cars by middlemen who already had customers for the cars.”42
However, unlike the MTIC/ carousel fraud cases where the middlemen
added very little value to the transaction – they were just conduits for the
fraud – in the UK car-flipping frauds the wheelchair users bring almost all of
the “value” to the table. Nothing is possible without a wheelchair user. As a
result wheelchair users in this fraud are better rewarded than the middlemen in
the MTIC/ carousel frauds.
3. High volume-high value transactions. In traditional MTIC/ carousel fraud
low risks and low profit margins encouraged middlemen to handle huge
volumes of product. The aggregate value of the stock of goods in
MTIC/carousel fraud tends to be very high.
In the case of UK car-flipping the volume of transactions are similarly
high43 and the value of the cars involved are certainly at the highest end of the
market.44
40

BBC, supra note 17.
There are however reports that the cars are re-sold by the wheelchair user, who “… without driving it,
sells it immediately to another dealership…” [BBC, supra note 17] and “… in some cases the cars never
left the showroom as it was bought back by the dealer who sold it.” [Andy Morgan, supra note 21].
42
BBC, supra note 17.
43
BBC, supra note 17 (indicating for example that “… On one afternoon … in Doncaster, South Yorkshire,
… four players each [bought] new cars. ‘That was £ 250,000 worth of business in two hours … one of the
same dealership’s showrooms in Lancashire is alleged to have sold 36 new cars to the same man in a year.”
41
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4. Extremely rapid turnover. In the traditional MTIC/ carousel fraud marketplace the norm is for product to turnover very fast. Contracts tend to be fully
executed, with full payment and final “delivery” on the same day. Multiple
sales and re-sales frequently occur (almost) simultaneously with goods
passing through four of five parties in one morning.
The turnover may not be as rapid in UK car-flipping as it is in MTIC/
carousel fraud, but given the fact that the transactions involve Lamborghini
Gallardos instead of computer chips, the turnover seems rapid enough. In the
case of the UK paralympic team, the members involved in car-flipping
according to the BBC purchased “… more than 100 cars each …” and that one
car dealership sold “… 36 new cars to the same man in a year.”45 Another
reported case had one individual ordering “… 37 cars in a month.”46
5. “Unusual” financial arrangements. There is a wide range of financial
practices in the traditional MTIC/ carousel fraud markets, and they appear (to
an outsider) to be non-standard. But (on most occasions) they reflect the
special characteristics of these marketplaces. For example, multiple parties
along a chain may meet (personally or through representatives) at a bank and
exchange funds for multiple transactions at the sale time [“A” paying “B” who
pays “C” who then pays “D”]. Also, payments made by a party near the end
of a long chain of transactions may be made directed to an (unknown) party
early in a chain (on behalf of multiple downstream parties in the chain).
In the case of UK car-flipping similarly unusual financial arrangements
appear. These arrangements make the transaction very low risk for the
wheelchair user and include pre-arranged financing, pre-arrangement of the
onward sale before the initial purchase is consummated, and payments in
advance to induce the wheelchair user to enter into the arrangement.47
6. Highly digital receptive. In the traditional MTIC/ carousel fraud marketplace enterprises like the Fresh N’ Clean laundry were entering into massive
commodity computer chip transactions in a 34 day period. The transactions
were valued at £63,324,715 (with 30 day credit terms extended to remote
buyers). These transactions attracted a VAT liability of £11,603,354.60 and
could only be conducted with the assistance of modern technology.

44

BBC, supra note 17. The BBC investigative reporter responded to the question “And they seem to be
dealing only in high value cars, why’s that?” in the following manner:
Well, there are two reasons. First of all, the higher the value of the car, the bigger the
savings on VAT. Secondly, these cars are not imports and high value UK cars with a
high spec are in great demand. There are often long waiting lists and buyers will some
times pay way over the odds to get them quickly.
45
BBC, supra note 17.
46
Tom Wells, supra note 35.
47
BBC, supra note 17.
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In a similar fashion it is difficult to imagine high-end car dealerships that
sell cars with values in excess of £140,000, that arrange the financing for the
initial purchase, and that arrange an onward sale to the next buyer are not
highly automated businesses.
There are two remaining characteristics of the UK car-flipping market-place that
are sufficiently different from what happens in the MTIC/carousel fraud market-place
that they become critically distinguishing characteristics. The fact that (1) UK carflipping is a B2C transaction,48 and MTIC/carousel fraud is a B2B transaction, and the
fact that (2) the UK car-flipping market-place is wholly artificial49 – it was created not
out of business necessity, but out of a desire to commit the fraud. Both of these elements
direct the solution to a different (but related) technological application.
Three Answers to UK Car-flipping Fraud
There are traditional (field audit) enforcement as well as administrative
enforcement answers to UK car-flipping fraud. The administrative answer can be digital
or non-digital, and the non-digital option can be viewed in Canada.50
The traditional (field audit) enforcement answer. When considering MTIC/
carousel fraud the traditional (field audit) enforcement approach is problematical. By
increasing the level and intensity of field audits within the intermediate wholesale
market-place for computer chips and cell phones HMRC became highly disruptive to
normal commercial practices. As a result, certified transaction tax systems provide a
better answer.
This is not the case with UK car-flipping fraud. Although the functioning of the
market-place is similar, heightening traditional enforcement measures would not disrupt
normal commercial activities, because the UK car-flipping market-place is artificial. It
exists only to facilitate the fraud, and the disruption of this market-place is exactly what
is desired. Thus, the traditional (field audit) enforcement answer is very viable.
The traditional audit might be somewhat expensive, and has the disadvantage of
allowing low-levels of fraud to persist. For example, rather than flipping 37 Lamborghini
Gallardos in a month one might expect wheelchair users to flip one every month or so (in
a “special order” situation), and perhaps even drive the car in the neighborhood for a day
or so. Identifying these individuals, particularly if they operate among a number of
48

MTIC/ carousel fraud involves B2B transactions.
MTIC/ carousel fraud occurred within a normal wholesale market-place set up to accomplish legitimate
business supply needs. MTIC/ carousel fraud corrupts the normal operation of this market-place.
50
Like the UK, Canada grants a GST exemption to wheelchair users that need specially equipped
automobiles, but the exemption is limited to the cost of the adaptation. [EXCISE TAX ACT, R.S.C., ch. E-15,
§ 258.1 (Can.) available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showdoc/cs/E-15/bo-ga:l_IX//en#anchorbo-ga:l_IX].
This kind of limited exemption was the rule in the UK until April 1, 2001 when the law was amended to
include the purchase of adapted vehicles. This change extended zero-rating to the cost of the entire vehicle.
The expansion of this provision is what really fueled the UK car-flipping fraud. [VAT Act, 1994, Schedule
8, Group 12, item 2A (as inserted by The Value Added Tax Order (2001) SI 2001/754)].
49

12

UK Car-flipping
Tax Notes International Submission – September 4, 2007
Richard T. Ainsworth

dealerships might be time consuming, and the audit cases might be a bit difficult to
expeditiously conclude.
The non-digital administrative enforcement answer. Canada administers its
exemption through a refund procedure, instead of a zero-rating procedure. Consumers
are required to pay the GST up front, and then within a four year window, apply for a
refund. Forms and instructions are provided for this purpose.51
Audit enforcement would clearly be enhanced with this option. Some of the most
egregious abuses of the system by wheelchair users would be more easily identified. One
would expect that “red flags” would be raised when an individual asks for 37 VAT
refunds in one month.52
The workability of the Canadian GST rebate in the context of the much larger
amounts of VAT that would need to be rebated under the UK exemption might be
problematical from a cash-flow perspective, particularly for the legitimate disable
consumer that the exemption is intended to benefit. It is one thing to pay the VAT up
front for £1,000 to £5,000 handicapped modifications to automobiles, and quite another
thing to wait for the government to refund a full £10,000 to £20,000 of VAT on the
purchase price of a luxury automobile. Disabled individuals might perceive this as an
unfair financial barrier-to-access.
The digital administrative enforcement answer. The digital answer is more
comprehensive. It accomplishes all that the non-digital answer does, but does so without
any of the cash-flow/ barrier-to-access problems. It also fits squarely within the preferred
solution (the certification of transaction tax compliance software) to the larger MTIC/
carousel fraud problem in B2B transactions. The Canadian car-flipping cases
demonstrate that this variant of the fraud is just as much of a threat to UK revenues as are
the frauds in computer chips and cell phones.
The earlier analysis of MTIC/ carousel fraud in the UK and Canada made two
recommendations, based on the evidence that the UK had a problem with cell phones and
computer chips that was identical to the problem that Canada had with car-flipping.
Those recommendations were:
Canada should selectively mandate the Digital VAT with certified
software in the intermediate wholesale market for automobiles and heavy
equipment.
The UK should selectively mandate the Digital VAT with certified
software in the intermediate wholesale market for cell phones and
computer chips.53

51

GST 518: GST/HST SPECIALLY EQUIPPED MOTOR VEHICLE REBATE APPLICATION, available at
http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pbg/gf/gst518/gst518-06e.pdf.
52
Tom Wells, Disabled “car scammer” is MBE, THE SUN (July 30, 2007) (emphasis in original) available
at http://www.thesun.co.uk/article/0,,2002410000-2007350066,00.html.
53
Ainsworth, Tackling VAT Fraud, supra note 7, at 280.
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The Digital VAT (D-VAT)54 solution essentially amounts to the certification of
third-party software systems along the lines of the Streamlined Sales Tax.55 The
recommendation is not for a full Digital VAT, but a selectively one. Only the industries
or market segments shown to be particularly susceptible to fraud would be targeted.
Adopting this solution would be fully consistent with the Lisbon Strategy.56 Based on
evidence of Canadian B2B car-flipping as well as the current wave of UK B2C carflipping, automobile dealerships seem to be an appropriate test environment for the DVAT.
The aspect of the D-VAT that is particularly relevant to UK car-flipping fraud is
the D-VAT card.57 The D-VAT card is an ID card that uses biometrics to confirm the
identity of the individual presenting the card. It also includes an embedded chip that
carries an exemption authorization certificate.58 Adopting the D-VAT Card is not the
same as adopting a system of digital national IDs.59 Use of the D-VAT card is voluntary
(not mandatory) and the card would be distributed within a limited group – only
individuals who were “qualified wheelchair users” could secure a card, and only those
within this group who wanted to purchase a car adapted for use by a disabled person at a
zero-rate of VAT would need to use it.
Essentially use of the D-VAT card would be similar to using a credit card. A
wheelchair user would present the card to the auto dealer at the time a vehicle (adapted so
that the disabled wheelchair user could operate it) is purchased. The D-VAT card would
interface with government computers over a secure line, and return a zero-rate
authorization code to the certified transaction tax software that would be required to be
installed in all auto dealerships.
Because the certified transaction tax software will only allow a zero-rated invoice
to issue after receiving this code, HMRC would not only be sure (1) that only qualified
wheelchair users were being zero-rated, but that (2) a real-time digital record of all
exempt purchases would be being compiled by HMRC. In addition, because the digital
54

See Richard T. Ainsworth, The Digital VAT: A Proposal for the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal
Tax Reform, 938-42 (TAX NOTES, August 22, 2005); Richard T. Ainsworth, The Digital VAT (D-VAT) 25
VA. TAX REV. 875 (2006).
55
STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX AGREEMENT (adopted November 12, 2002, amended November 19,
2003 and further amended November 16, 2004) available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org.
56
European Commission, eEurope - An Information Society for all, COM(2000)0130 final available at
http://europa.eu.int (last visited Aug. 2, 2006) (indicating that the “Lisbon Strategy” is a shorthand
expression for the broad e-commerce policy objectives set out at the Lisbon European Council of March 24
and 24, 2000); Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, eEurope 2005: An Information
Society for All. An Action Plan to be Presented in view of the Sevilla European Council, 21/22 June 2002.
COM(2002)263 final, available at http://ue.eu.int (last visited Aug. 2, 2006) (presenting the specific steps
expected to be taken to achieve the “Lisbon Strategy” by 2010).
57
D-VAT 25 VA. TAX REV., at 935-36.
58
Richard T. Ainsworth, Biometrics: Solving the Regressivity of VATs and RSTs with “Smart Card”
Technology, 7 Fla. Tax Rev. 651 (2006) (presenting the case for .
59
For a list of publication on the national ID project consult the research on the web site of the UK Home
Office, Identity and Passport Service at http://www.identitycards.gov.uk/index.asp.
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administrative model works through a zero-rating mechanism, wheelchair users
purchasing vehicle would not have the cash-flow concerns that are present in the
Canadian system of GST refunds.
What About Brazil?
Or, What if Car-flipping is not be just a Canadian and UK Problem
If car-flipping is a common VAT fraud pattern, and if car-flipping has both a B2B
manifestation in Canada (where it is the largest GST fraud in Canadian history) and a
B2C manifestation in the UK (where it is the most recent wave in a series of VAT fraud
schemes the UK is struggling with), then is it possible that car-flipping is a problem
elsewhere?
The inclination is to say, “Yes.” The place to look is in a jurisdiction where (a)
cars for disabled persons are exempt from consumption tax, (b) where the rate of tax is
significant, and (c) where the re-sale of the vehicle by a disabled person (as an individual,
not as a business) is also exempt.
Brazil is such a jurisdiction.60 In the following example we will consider just two
of the Brazilian consumption taxes that apply to motor vehicles: (1) the federal tax on
manufactured goods IPI (Imposto sobre Productos Industrializados), and (2) the state
VAT-like tax ICMS (Impostos Sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Prestação de
Serviços).
At the federal level, in the IPI classification of cars with engines between 1,500cc
and 3,000cc with a seating capacity of six or less (including the driver), the tax rate is
25%. But, if the same car is for a disabled person,61 and sold to the disabled person or a
member of his family, the tax rate is 0%.62
60

Other jurisdictions would include Venezuela where there is a very similar unlimited exemption for the
purchase of automobiles adapted for the use of handicapped persons. In Venezuela there is no limitation on
the number of vehicles that a handicapped individual can purchase, how long the vehicle needs to be
retained by this individual, or other common limits like the size of the engine. See Code (LIVA) Article 18
(5), Decree 5212, 02/26/2007. A similar exemption can be found in Spain, but it is tied to a reduced 4%
rate. Because the standard rate in Spain is 16%, the financial incentive to flip cars is 12%, lower than the
incentive in the UK which is at 17.5%.
61
One significant difference between the Brazilian and UK rules is that the Brazilian law does not require
that the car be modified to allow the disabled person to use it. The law in Rio, for example, has just
changed on exactly this point. Previously the car needed to be altered or prepared so that the disabled
person could not operate the car. Now, following federal legislation under the IPI, the rule for the Rio
ICMS is that the disabled person may be a passenger. (Implementing regulations however, have not been
issued in Rio.)
62
Law nº 8.989, February 24 of 1995, valid until December 31 of 2009 (as extended by article 69 of Law
11.196, November 21st of 2005) (granting an exemption (“ïsenção”) for IPI (the federal tax) on sales of
cars to disabled persons, and although granted as an exemption the law (in Art. 4) it permits the producer to
keep the credits on inputs of the car sold – in effect zero-rating the transaction). This law has undergone a
number of changes over the years. Four important development have occurred:
(1) Initially there was a limitation on the power of the vehicle (limited to 127 HP) and only limited
only to cars that used renewable fuel. After Law 10.754, of October 31 2003 those requirements
were abolished;
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At the state level, in the ICMS in the State of Sao Paulo for example, in the same
classification category referenced above, the tax rate is 12% (that is, the purchase is
subject to ICMS withholding – perception).63 However (following the federal IPI and as
part of the same transaction) where the same car is purchased by a disabled person the
ICMS tax rate is 0%.64
If a disabled person re-sells the automobile he purchased free of IPI and ICMS the
onward sale is not subject to IPI or ICMS – provided the car is re-sold in the individual’s
capacity as a non-registered private individual.65
The calculation of the tax in Brazil is as follows. If we assume the dealer cost
plus the dealer profit is 100,000, then the IPI is 25,000. In determining the ICMS, the IPI
is part of the base. Thus, the dealer (in a taxable sale) will charge the consumer a total of
142,045.45. The calculation can be seen below (it is easiest to see it from the top down,
rather than the bottom up):
Full Purchase Price (with IPI + ICMS) =
Less: ICMS [12% x 142,045.45 = 17,045.45]
Less: IPI [25% x 100,000 = 25,000]
Dealer cost + profit margin

142,045.45
<17,045.45>
125,000.00
<25,000.00>
100,000.00

Thus, the total tax (IPI and ICMS) on the purchase of a new 100,000.00 car is
42,045.45.66

(2) Initially the exemption was only for physically disabled people. After Law 10.690, from June 16
of 2003, the exemption was extended to people with visual problems, mental severe or profound,
or autistic problems. As a result, for federal purposes (IPI), the car may now be purchased,
directly by the disabled or through a person who legally represents him or her, and the car itself
may be operated by another;
(3) After Law 10.690, Art. 5 (June 16, 2003) it is a requirement that the disabled person prove
personal financial capability to purchase the vehicle that is intended to be acquired.
(4) Initially the exemption could be used only once every 3 years by each disabled person. After Law
11.196, from November 21, 2005 this period was reduced to 2 years.
63
Sao Paolo State Law 6.374 (Mar. 1, 1989) at Art. 34, para. 1(12) (indicating the rate of tax for
classification TIPI 8703.23.10 to be 12%).
64
Sao Paolo State Law 6.374 (Mar. 1, 1989) at Art. 5, para. 4(1) (indicating the rate of tax for
classification TIPI 8713.90.00 to be 0%).
65
The federal exemption for the resale for individuals not registered as taxpayers is at Decreto No. 4544, de
26 de decembre de 2002, at Arts. 8 to 11. The same exemption at the state level is found at Sao Paolo State
Law 6.374 (Mar. 1, 1989) at Art. 7.
66
What actually happens under the Brazilian consumption taxes is a bit more complex. In fact what the IPI
exemption does is allow the manufacturer to deduct the IPI it paid on inputs used in the car that is
eventually purchased by the disabled person. If the car is sold through a dealer and then on to a
handicapped person there is no IPI charged to the dealer. The same is true with the ICMS. There is no
forward charge of ICMS to the handicapped person, but the dealer will be allowed to deduct ICMS related
to the sale. Thus, the actual “tax loss” to the government is less than the “tax benefit” to the disabled
person.
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This means that a disabled person67 will be able to purchase this car for
100,000.00, and a non-disabled person will pay approximately 42% more. Compared
with the 7% GST in Canada (which may be raised in some provinces by an additional 8%
HST or PST for a total tax burden of 15%), and the 17.5% VAT in the UK, both of which
provide more than sufficient financial incentive for car-flipping fraud, it seems much
more likely that this fraud will be found in Brazil where the rate of tax is more than twice
that in Canada or the UK.
There is considerable anecdotal evidence that car-flipping or abuse of the
exemption is a problem in Brazil. However, public records of enforcement actions are
not abundant. It is not clear why this is the case, but it could be that the scope of the
exemption is expanding so rapidly in Brazil, that it is difficult for the tax administration
to “draw a line in the sand.”
Unlike the UK rule, where there must be a modification to the car that will enable
the disabled person to operate it, there is no such requirement in Brazil. In addition, the
definition of “disable person” for purposes of the exemption is expanding, making even
people who could not operate an automobile qualified to purchase without consumption
tax obligations.
To take just two examples: one administrative and the other from litigation. Last
year the State of Rio de Janeiro expanded the definition of a disabled person to include
individuals who could not operate the car. Thus, blind individuals now qualify for
exemption. This rule (the expansion of the exemption) is not currently effective, because
the tax authorities have not issued the regulations necessary for implementation. Some
suspect the delay has to do with apprehension about expanding the current level of tax
abuse.
The second is Civil Appeal n.º 2006.041277-7, from the State Tribunal of Justice
of the State of Santa Catarina, a case that was decided this year. It demonstrates the
disability problem from the perspective of the IPI and ICMS. In this case the second
panel of judges granted Ms. Franciele Miiqueloto Schimitz the right of ICMS exemption
(and also the State Tax over property taxes on a car) because she was a disabled person.
The Federal IRS had granted her an IPI exemption, but the IRS of the State of
Santa Catarina denied her the ICMS exemption. In the view of the Santa Catarina IRS,
because she was blind and could not drive a car, she had no need for an exemption. The
court decided that if the law granted exemptions for disabled people with vision
problems, it was not appropriate for the ICMS to adopt a requirement that the disabled
person be able to operator a car upon which an exemption applied.68

67

The only significant litigation on this exemption in Brazil involves disabled individuals demanding a
refund of the taxes paid on the purchase of cars for their use.
68
Civil Appeal n.º 2006.041277-7, available at http://www.direito2.com.br/tjsc/2007/mar/20/carro-paraportadora-de-necessidade-especial-tem-isencao (in Portuguese).
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There are no news reports (like that of the BBC) reporting on car-flipping fraud in
Brazil. There are no chains of litigated cases on car-flipping, like those in Canada that
one can consult in Brazil. This does not mean that there is no problem in Brazil – quite
the contrary. Perhaps in the tentativeness of the tax administration and the power of the
Brazilian judiciary we may be seeing how difficult it is to make progress on an issue that
ultimately means that the government must take its blind, wheelchair disabled, crippled
and stretcher-carried citizens to court for tax fraud.
Conclusion
Car-flipping is a type of VAT fraud that is analytically very similar to MTIC,
carousel and contra-trading frauds. All of these frauds exploit exemptions in the VAT,
sometimes the exemption is intended to prefer a minority group (disabled, status Indians),
other time the exemption is a necessary attribute of a federal VAT (the zero-rating of
intra-community sales).
Three ingredients combine to ignite this fraud: (1) a significant consumption tax
rate; (2) a selective exemption;70 (3) a market-place where the benefit of the exemption
can be transferred from those who are entitled to it (but may not value it highly) to those
who do not have it (but who would value it highly). There also seems to be an accelerant
in this mix – a factor that when thrown upon the flames will make this fraud explode
within the tax system – small sized, high value commodity goods.
69

The raging VAT fraud currently witnessed in the UK (the MTIC, carousel, and
contra-trading varieties) is feeding off accelerants – computer chips and cell phones. But
the fraud is also present in Lamborghini Gallardos (hardly a commodity product).
Certified software solutions have been proposed to counter these frauds. This
solution targets the only one of the elements that is open to administrative solution.
Lowering the VAT rate and modifying VAT exemptions are exceptionally difficult
(essentially political) questions. Regulating the market-place is much easier, and is what
tax administration is all about. Doing it digitally is what the Lisbon Strategy is all about.
Closing Caveat
UK car-flipping is not just a UK problem. The single market allows any disabled
citizen of any of the other 26 Member States to travel to London, purchase (and take
possession of) a Lamborghini Gallardos, and with a UK address register the car (probably
displaying UK plates) and then “flip” it for a profit. The actual “flipping” need not occur
69

Thus, one would expect that this kind of fraud could be charted along a sliding scale with the Canadian
GST (7%) at the low end; Venezuela next (9% - as of July 1, 2007); then the Spanish VAT (12% - because
the Spanish allow a reduced 4% rate down from the standard 16% rate); followed by the Canadian
GST/HST (15% - 7% GST + 8% HST, where applicable); the United Kingdom (17.5%); and finally Brazil
(40+%). There is undoubtedly more to the scale.
70
This car-flipping fraud, for example, will not be found in Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Switzerland,
France, Belgium and Luxembourg, because these VAT jurisdictions do not provide this exemption for
disabled individuals.
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in London. If one wanted more, one could take the car to Denmark, or Sweden where the
margin scheme, a local dealer and a 25% standard rate will put more “profit” in the
“flip.”
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